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APRIL 1997 EDITION
by Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb
Reprinted with permission from The Informed Soul,
For this reason I have found it useful to start with a discussion
of equality. When we appreciate the differences among various
concepts of equality, and the limitations of our commitments to
each, we will be more open minded in our examination of the
traditional concept of Jewish chosenness. Three different concepts
of equality will be considered: Descriptive equality (people are in
fact equal), prescriptive equality (people should be treated equally),
and ideal equality (people should be made as equal as possible). The
extent of our commitment to each will be explored, together with
the possibility of conflict with chosenness. We will then be able to
turn to a discussion of the idea of chosenness itself.
(1) Descriptive equality: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. . ." The Declaration of Independence thus states its belief that people are in fact equal to one another. (Indeed, it holds this belief to be self-evident--not requiring any investigation, evidence, argument, etc.!) Now in some respects this is clearly true. We are all born (at least, until cloning is perfected), we all die, we all breathe, eat, sleep, excrete, etc. Certain experiences affect us with pleasure (love, success, ice cream) and pain (failure, a visit to the dentist). But in other respects it is clearly false. We vary considerably in physical characteristics (height, weight, strength, coordination, color, beauty), intelligence, personality traits (sympathy, sensitivity, industry, self-control) and certain sources of pleasure (Bach is preferred by some, the Beatles by others). Given all these differences, does a blanket assertion of equality make any sense? The truth is that we are all equal in some respects and unequal in others. Since we cannot say that the former are more numerous (how would we count respects?) or more important (are breathing and nutrition more important than intelligence and character?), assertions of blanket equality serve only to divert attention from the differences. Some respond to these observations by saying that the differences cited hold only for adults and are the result of family, education and culture. As babies, we are all equal, and if we equalized opportunity, we would be more equal as adults. Now even if this were true, it is not clear what it proves. We do differ as adults, and it is impossible to equalize all aspects of environmental influence (not all children can be the oldest in the family, parents will differ in their abilities; climates and natural resources will vary etc., etc.). Thus adult differences are a permanent feature of humanity. Furthermore, the belief in baby equality is based upon no direct evidence (we cannot test the intelligence and character of newborns directly). Babies certainly differ in some respects, as various birth defects and genetic syndromes show. The extent of their differences simply cannot be measured at the present time. The belief in baby equality thus lacks evidence and is of doubtful relevance. It should be pointed out that just as individuals differ in character and abilities, so do nations. They are consistently strong in certain areas and weak in others. The United States, for example, is consistently strong in technology and weak in fundamental theoretical science.(No United States scientist has made a theoretical contribution on a par with Newton, Maxwell, Rutherford, Bohr, Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg, etc.--work that will be read with interest a hundred years later. Michaelson and Marley, who devised the experiment which prepared the way for [simple] relativity failed to understand its theoretical implications and judged it a failure.) Germanic education has produced one-third of the Nobel prizes in science in this century. The intellectual-cultural contribution of the Jewish people throughout the millennia, and especially in the last century, is vastly out of proportion to their numbers and objective opportunities. And there are differences of accepted practices as well. Much of the British police force goes without firearms; in the United States that would be unthinkable. The explanation of these differences is problematic, just as it is for individuals. Whether they are wholly the effect of environment and experience, or in part reflect inherent differences, is impossible to prove at present. How does descriptive equality, to the extent that it is true, affect Jewish chosenness? If Judaism asserts that Jews and non-Jews differ across the board in some respect, and we could prove that (some) Jews and non-Jews are equal in that respect, then chosenness would be unacceptable. What we cannot do is oppose chosenness by a blind, blanket commitment to equality: "You say Jews are different? We believe that all people are equal so you must be wrong." When we examine the respects in which Judaism distinguishes Jews from non-Jews, we will see that none of them are subject to objective disproof. Thus Judaism has no difficulty with descriptive equality. (2) Prescriptive equality: The equal assignment of rights and responsibilities to all citizens is often taken as the hallmark of a democratic society. Singling out a particular group for special rights and responsibilities seems to undermine equality of all citizens before the law. But is it really true that democracy requires no legal distinctions between citizens? Let's consider some examples. Until recently the United States draft law could be written roughly as follows: A citizen age eighteen shall be subject to the draft unless the citizen is female, a college student, has an I.Q. under 60, is a paraplegic, part of a family of which two members have died in foreign wars of the United States, etc. This law assigns an awesome responsibility: to risk one's life in defense of the nation. Is this responsibility applied equally to all citizens? It seems not, since those under eighteen years of age, female, studying in college, etc., are exempted. As a second example, consider education. We expect that the right to free, public schooling should be equal for all citizens. But is it? Blind, deaf, crippled and other handicapped children receive many times more the funds allotted to the education of normal children. Equal right to education ought to mean that the same amount of money should be spent on each student; if the children of a particular religious group or political party received extra funds, we would surely call that undemocratic discrimination. But as the examples of handicapped children show, no one believes in equal allotments for all students. The same holds for many other social services: welfare only for the indigent, Medicare only for the elderly, etc. Finally, let's examine the most characteristic right of democratic societies--the right to vote. Is voting equal for all citizens? There are restrictions of age, citizenship, residence (if you live in New Jersey, you can't vote in New York even if you work in Manhattan and have great interest in New York's laws) and criminal conviction. Even voting is assigned to a specific group and not granted blindly to all. What these examples show is that we do single out groups of citizens for special privileges and responsibilities. Now it is sometimes objected that these distinctions are the result of democratic legal procedures and therefore reflect "the will of the people." ''If that is the way the society wants to distribute rights and responsibilities, it is its prerogative to do so." Now perhaps it is correct that societies have this authority to distinguish among their citizens (though the example of the Nazis remind us that there are limits). However, the objection misses the point: These social decisions show that societies are not committed to treating their citizens equally. To legitimize their ability to make distinctions among their citizens is to support our observation that those distinctions are acceptable. A second common response is that no one expects equality to be blind (even though, in classical statuary, that is the way justice is usually represented!). Of course relevant differences must be taken into account in assigning rights and responsibilities. There is no point in assigning a cripple to the infantry, or in allowing ten-year-olds to vote. Surely what equality means is that people who have all the same relevant characteristics should be treated the same. With this objection I think we can agree. It concedes that distinctions be made among citizens on the basis of relevant characteristics, and only when people do not differ in these respects are they to be treated the same. But then equality can be completely dispensed with in describing rights and responsibilities. To be told, ''All and only male, eighteen-year-old, physically and mentally fit non-college students, etc., are eligible for the draft," is to be told who is and who is not eligible. To add, ''All those (non-)eligible are equally (non-)eligible," does nothing to the rule at all. Thus in practice, associated with each right or responsibility will be a description of the group of people to which it applies. To be told that people are still being treated equally since everyone, if under eighteen, female, etc., also would be exempt from the draft, does not equalize rights and responsibilities in the real world. One might as well have told American women before 1920 that they had equal voting rights since if they were men, they would be able to vote! How does this conclusion relate to Jewish chosenness? If it could be demonstrated that a right or responsibility which morally ought to apply to a particular group were assigned by Judaism to a different group, then there would be an objection against Judaism. The case would have to be argued in specifics. It cannot be asserted: "We are against distinctions in rights and responsibilities in principle and therefore cannot tolerate any idea of chosenness." As we have seen, no one holds such a principle of equality. (3). Ideal equality: This idea takes for granted that people are different, and should be treated differently. It asserts that one goal of this treatment ought to be the reduction of differences between people, insofar as this is possible. The extra money spent on educating the handicapped is an excellent example. The point of singling them out for special (unequal) treatment is to help them become as independent and functional as possible. Thus they will become as much like the normal population as possible. This is an ideal with which Judaism can wholly agree. Chosenness in no way opposes efforts to reduce differences, when those efforts take realistic account of the inherent limitations the differences impose. In sum, there is no obvious conflict between equality and the Jewish idea of chosenness. The case for a conflict would have to be made by finding specific descriptive or prescriptive Jewish distinctions which can be conclusively refuted. It cannot be made by mouthing slogans of blanket equality which no one really believes. Concerning the charge of racism, two facts serve to rule it out in any literal sense. The first is conversion -- one can voluntarily become Jewish, whereas racial identity cannot be changed. The second is that hereditary Jewishness is matriarchal --a person is born a Jew if and only if his mother is Jewish. The identity of the father is irrelevant. No racial identification can depend only upon a person's mother. Of course, one may admit that Jews are not a race and yet object to any group being described and treated differently. But then, as we have just seen, the burden will be upon him to argue his case in detail.
ChosennessA full account of the Jewish idea of chosenness would require answering such questions as: In what ways--descriptive and prescriptive -- does Judaism distinguish between Jews and non-Jews? Are these differences inherent? If so, how is conversion possible? How did these differences come about? Why are they dependent only upon maternal ancestry? In order to hold our discussion to manageable size, we will focus on one general characterization of chosenness. But first, we need to clear away a popular misconception. There is a widespread understanding of chosenness which restricts this idea to task only. Jews are not inherently different from other people; they have a unique challenge to live a certain way of life which may inspire others. God has a moral-spiritual message which is to be delivered to mankind via the living example of the Jewish people. But, in principle, many other nations could have been chosen for this purpose. As convenient as this understanding is from an egalitarian point of view, it is unacceptable for two reasons. First, it is incompatible with the classical Jewish sources on the subject. (See Derech Hashem, II:4 and the sources cited there.) Therefore it cannot be an account of the classical Jewish concept. Second, it gives an extremely peculiar picture of God's process of choice. We noted above that nations differ in character. These differences will affect a nation's appropriateness for so comprehensive a challenge as the total Jewish way of life. That challenge emphasizes certain traits of character: humility, self-sacrifice, courage, steadfastness, etc. It demands the development of certain abilities: deep human understanding, intellectualism and scholarship, and a philosophical understanding of life. It requires enormous behavioral self-discipline to respond to each life situation in accordance with a detailed, idealized plan of action. To think that the differences between nations will not substantially affect their appropriateness for this challenge is patently unreasonable. The choice could not have been arbitrary: God must have chosen the Jewish people for this challenge because their abilities and propensities made them the most appropriate for it. Of course, even if we agree that there is a unique fit between Jewish national character and the Torah way of life, this does not explain how that character was formed. Concerning national character in general, opinions divide on the relative contributions of historical experience and inherent endowments. This debate parallels the discussion of baby equality, and is similarly impossible to resolve objectively in our present state of knowledge. Therefore we may note the account in Jewish sources without fear of objective refutation. Briefly, Jewish national character is the result of both factors mentioned above: Certain basic traits are inherited from the patriarchs, Abraham, Issac and Jacob and then molded by historical experience. The patriarchs, due to the inherent quality of their souls and their enormous self-development, established the foundations of Jewish character. This foundation is then the starting point for all future Jewish experience. (Although it is "passed down" from generation to generation, we must not think of it in genetic terms. Remember that only maternal ancestry counts, and it is available to converts. This is a spiritual transmission.) After all, objective circumstances do not determine the content of experience: One person may be exhilarated by a challenge while a second may be totally unnerved. Slavery in Egypt, the exodus, the revelation at Sinai, the forty years in the wilderness, the conquest of the land of Israel -- as experienced by the fundamental patriarchal character--produced the basis of Jewish national character. What can be said specifically about this unique character of the Jewish people? Of course, using the correspondence between challenge and ability, we could survey the entire corpus of Jewish law and values and then say: The uniqueness of the Jew is that his inherent nature is appropriate for this challenge. But this is utterly impractical since it would take several lifetimes to complete the survey. Instead, let's try to get some general perspective on the challenge, and use that as an indicator of a general description of Jewish uniqueness. There is an important, little-known distinction concerning value. (The idea, and its application to chosenness, were brought to my attention by Rabbi Nochum Lansky.) Some things are valuable because they are better than the alternative. They have, we might say, comparative value; they are preferable in comparison with what will happen if they are not realized. For example, health is preferable to disease, education to ignorance, and being loved to being hated. By contrast, some things are valuable without consideration of any alternatives or comparisons. We might call this non-comparative value. This type of value is difficult to explain. Whenever we consider the value of a thing, aren't we at least implicitly comparing it with its alternative? If we consider the value of health, can we ignore the fact that the alternative is disease and that health is preferable to disease? I think we can. Let's consider two illustrations. Imagine God deciding whether to create the universe. He asks your opinion. (Don't ask me how you got here!) If you can answer, "Yes--create the universe so that X will come into existence, because X is valuable," then you are judging that X has non-comparative value. For, as things stand now, neither X nor its alternative exist. Thus recommending X in these circumstances cannot be the result of comparison with an alternative. As a second illustration, imagine a prediction of mankind's imminent demise (the earth is to pass through deadly radiation). You describe this as an immense tragedy. When asked why, you answer, "Because without mankind X will disappear, and X is valuable." Here again, your judgment accords X non-comparative value. For, when mankind disappears neither X nor its alternative will exist. Thus to say health has non-comparative value means that health could be a reason for creating the universe: "Create mankind," we might say, "since some people will be healthy, and health is valuable." Or: "Mankind's disappearance is a tragedy since there will be no more health." These judgments don't depend upon health being preferable to disease. The crucial difference between the two types of value is this: Comparative value relates to a particular state of a thing, while non-comparative value relates to its very existence. If health is merely preferable to disease, then being healthy is a valuable state of an already existing person, but it is no reason to create another person. Something which has non-comparative value makes the existence of its possessor valuable. We now arrive at the central question: What has non-comparative value? I think we can rule out certain candidates immediately. Wealth might be preferable to poverty, but it could hardly be a reason for creating the universe. Health is preferable to disease, but the loss of healthy specimens is not a reason to mourn mankind's passing. Education is preferable to ignorance, but the mere possession of information does not make our very existence valuable. The same could be said of many common values--fame, power, intelligence, etc. What then is left which really does have non-comparative value? Classical Judaism has an answer to this question, however here we run into a fundamental problem. It is really impossible to put the answer into words--it has to be experienced to be understood. Nevertheless, I will try to say something. It is a certain moral-spiritual quality of life which in Jewish terms has non-comparative value. A person who achieves this quality sufficiently throughout his life is called a "tzaddik", righteous. The rest of us achieve this value during intermittent moments of striving to become more like a tzaddik. If we had to advise God on creating the universe, or mourn mankind's passing, our reason would be that some people will be tzaddikim, and others will strive to become tzaddikim. For the sake of that value it is worthwhile for the universe to exist, and mankind's demise would be an immeasurable tragedy. Now since it is a quality of life which is in question, it must at least be observed (if not experienced) in order to be understood. But perhaps a few incidents from the lives of righteous individuals will give a hint at its nature. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein arrived one morning at his yeshiva. As he got out of the car, the driver unwittingly slammed the door on his fingers. Reb Moshe hid his stricken hand and, biting his lips with pain, walked into the building without giving any visible sign to the driver. When those who observed the incident asked his reason for acting thus, he explained: "That young man was so generous to drive me to the yeshiva. Could I hurt his feelings by showing him that something went wrong?" Now remember that Judaism is not a religion of self-torture--we do not lie on beds of nails, etc.--Reb Moshe did feel the pain. Furthermore, he was not prepared for it. (On the way to the dentist you stir up your courage in order to bear the pain quietly.) The impact of the door on his fingers triggered two contradictory impulses--a cry of pain and a desire not to embarrass the driver. The latter won out because Reb Moshe's involvement with another person's embarrassment was deeper and more powerful than response to his own physical pain! This is an indication of the unique moral level that Judaism requires. Two incidents from the beginning of this century illustrate the intensity of Jewish spirituality. The Modzitzer Rebbe had a leg amputated. No anesthesia was available. During the operation he composed a 64-part musical composition. Rabbi Naftali Amsterdam required an operation and refused anesthesia on the grounds that he did not want his Talmudic research interrupted! These men possessed the ability to focus on the spiritual to the point that physical awareness and sensation were completely blocked out. (I am not appealing to the supernatural here. We all experience this to some degree: focusing on one aspect of our experience partly blocks awareness of other aspects. For example, athletes often feel the full intensity of the pain only after the competition is over. What is unique in Jewish spirituality is the degree of focus, and its object --involvement with God.) These events illustrate a total absorption in the moral-spiritual dimension of life. It is this quality of experience and action which Judaism accords non-comparative value. For a greater appreciation I recommend the biographies of Rabbi Aryeh Levin (A Tzaddik in Our Time) and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Reb Moshe). In the meantime, we can say this. The whole of Jewish Law and values is designed to develop this quality of life. If, as we said above, Jewish national character is uniquely suited to this challenge, then we can describe what makes the Jew different as follows. The Jew is naturally suited to developing the moral-spiritual dimension of life to the point where it determines his experience and action. This is his chosenness.
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Answer: To say that Jews have this special potentiality is to say that under certain specific conditions Jews and non-Jews will develop differently. As far as external conditions are concerned -- economics, population size and density, political status, etc.--we can make reasonable comparisons. But cultural input will usually be very different, so it is very difficult to imagine a conclusive test. The traditional position is therefore not refuted by your observations.
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